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Transition to 21st Century Socialism
in the European Union
Paul Cockshott, Allin Cottrell, Heinz Dieterich
Th is paper attempts to outline the economic steps that would be necessary to convert 
a capitalist economy like the EU into a socialist one. We examine the issue in very 
concrete terms and propose specifi c policy measures. Th e measures we propose diff er 
signifi cantly from the tradition of 20th century European Social Democracy.
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Keynes famously remarked that practical political men, whether they be 
cautious or bold, found themselves unconsciously repeating the ideas of long 
dead economists. Politicians who advance neo-liberalism are, whether they 
know it or not, repeating the ideas of the reactionary Austrian economists 
Mises and Hayek. Socialist politicians purvey, in simplifi ed form, the ideas 
of long dead Germanic Social Democratic economists such as Kautsky, 
Bernstein and Bauer. 
1 Background
Historically, the dominant perspective on socialism has been that developed 
in the German Social Democratic Party in the years before the fi rst world 
war. Th e SPD was the strongest and most infl uential party in the Socialist 
International and its ideas infl uenced other parties, including both the 
British Labour Party1 and the European Communist Parties. Lih2[3] has 
shown the extent to which the Leninism to which the latter subscribed was 
in fact just a re-labeling of classical German Social Democracy. We are used 
to see Social Democracy and Communism as very diff erent, but the original 
distinguishing feature of Communism – that it sought power by preparing 
armed insurrection, was long ago abandoned by most communist political 
parties. Th is original communist principle has been retained only by Maoist 
parties in Asia and South America, all other left  wing parties are in this sense 
Social Democrats.
When we use the word Social Democratic therefore we are refering to 
a tradition which existed prior to 1914. In the 1950s the original German 
Social Democrats abandoned their commitment to public ownership of the 
means of production, aft er which the term Social Democrat changed its 
popular meaning, and came to indicate a tendancy somewhere to the right 
of socialism. Socialists in the Labour Party in Britain and the Socialist Party 
in France counterposed themselves to this later meaning Social Democracy 
from the 1960s. We would argue however that so long as the Labour Party 
retiained its 1918 programatic commitment:
1 We would argue that by the mid 1950s the British Labour Party was more 
classically Social Democratic than the then SPD.
2 We elaborate on this in our book [1, 2].
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“To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and 
the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of 
the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, 
and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each 
industry or service.”
Once this programmatic commitment was dropped by Blair, the LP 
ceased to have any connection with Social Democracy in its original sense.
It was not until the 1940s that European (as opposed to Russian) Social 
Democracy got an opportunity to try changing the economic system. Th e 
UK, the newly formed GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and other countries 
embarked on an economic transformation that had certain common 
characteristics: 
  Key industries were taken into state ownership. 
  Education and healthcare became free state services. 
  Publicly owned housing became the dominant form of new construction.
  Attempts were made, either by confi scation or by inheritance taxation, to 
diminish the great landed estates. 
  Th e state attempted to follow a policy of full employment. 
Th ere were obviously diff erences. In Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia 
agriculture was largely brought under state control whereas in the UK and 
Poland state farms played a much more minor role, with intervention in the 
UK being mainly through state marketing boards. We will concentrate for a 
while on the UK, both because the authors are particularly familiar with it, 
and also because UK economic policy had a big international impact.
Th e process of nationalisation of industry did not go so far in the UK as 
in Eastern Europe, but even there by the late 1970s the state owned among 
other things 
  the system of energy production and supply: coal, oil, gas, nuclear power 
and hydro electricity; 
  much of the transport system: roads, railways, buses, airlines, airports, 
ports; 
  the communication system: radio, TV, post, telephones; 
  the majority of the housing stock; and 
  many heavy industries: steel, shipbuilding, aircraft  construction, car 
production. 
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However the old property owning classes were not expropriated in the West 
and many sections of industry remained in private hands. A reliance was placed 
on inheritance taxes to eventually expropriate the property owning classes. 
Tax avoidance meansures by the wealthy meant that these taxes had less eff ect 
than hoped. Th e existence of such a large state sector, in combination with a 
strong trade union movement, had, by the mid-1970s, seriously threatened 
the continued viability of the remaining capitalist sections of the economy, 
resulting in a major crisis of profi tability. Th ere was a lively debate within 
British Social Democracy about what to do. Should the crisis be resolved by 
more vigorous state controls over prices and incomes whilst retaining the 
existing private sector? Should it be resolved by extending state ownership 
and using a new state investment bank to fund investment?
Th e Labour Party was eff ectively paralysed with indecision and was 
replaced in 1979 by a radical neo-liberal government headed by Mrs Th atcher. 
Th is reversed many of the social democratic changes made aft er 1945 with the 
explicit aim of returning to a classical liberal capitalist economy.
Within a decade, neo-liberal policy had become dominant not only 
in Britain but in all of the European countries in which classical Social 
Democratic economic policies had been most infl uential. Paradoxically, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, in which Social Democratic economics had 
made less inroads, was one of the last countries to move to neo-liberalism.
Now, in the 21st century and in face of the most serious crisis of capitalism 
since the 1930s, there is an historic opportunity to reassert the original ideals 
and objectives of the socialist and democratic workers movements But this 
cannot simply be a repetition of the past. In this proposal we try to develop an 
alternative that diff ers in the following ways from past European Socialism:
1. We do not place the nationalisation of industry at the center of our 
concerns; instead we emphasise a positive assertion of the rights of 
labour to the full value added. 
2. We propose a radical restructuring of monetary policy to move the 
whole economy towards a non-money ‘equivalence economy’ based on 
working time. 
3. We envisage transition as taking place not at the level of the nation state 
but within a democratised European Union. 
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Let us summarise key features of our conception of mature socialism:
 
1. Th e economy is based on the deliberate and conscious application of the 
labour theory of value as developed by Adam Smith and Karl Marx. It is 
a model in which consumer goods are priced in terms of the hours and 
minutes of labour it took to make them, and in which each worker is paid 
labour credits for each hour worked. Th e consistent application of this 
principle eliminates economic exploitation. 
2. Industry is publicly owned, run according to a plan and not for profi t. 
Retail enterprises for example, work on a break-even rather than profi t 
making basis. We envisage the transition to publicly owned enterprises 
as being a gradual process that will occur aft er rather than before the 
abolition of the wages system. 
3. Decisions are taken democratically, at local, national and Union levels. 
Th is applies in particular to decisions about the level of taxation and 
state expenditure. Such democratic decision making is vital to prevent 
the replacement of private exploitation with exploitation by the state. 
In addition we take seriously Marx’s aphorism that the liberation of the 
working classes must be the work of the working classes themselves. Th is 
is refl ected in our advocacy of direct participative democracy rather than 
cabinet or party government and also aff ects our philosophy of how a 
transition to socialism has to take place. Instead of the old Social Democratic 
emphasis on the direct action of the state in nationalising and taking over 
private companies, we advocate the establishment of positive legal rights for 
labour. Th ese rights will, when collectively exercised by workers, bring to an 
end the exploitation of labour by capital.
 
2 Money and exploitation
Th e European economy will still based on money at the point at which the 
socialist movement comes to power. In Capital, Marx showed how money 
was at the root of the evils of capitalism. Th e essence of capitalism is to start 
out with a sum of money at the beginning of the year and end up with a 
larger sum at the end. Marx denoted this by M->M’ where M might be £”£” 
1,000,000 for example and M’=£”£” 2,000,000.
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Because capitalists have more money than working people, they can use this 
money to hire workers to work for wages. As Adam Smith pointed out, in any 
bargain over the price of their labour, workers are in a weaker position than 
employers. Th eir wages are much less than the value they create during the 
working week. Since the capitalists can sell the product for more value than 
they paid out in wages, the capitalists become richer and richer while workers 
stay as poor as ever. Th is process is the root cause of the diff erence between 
rich and poor.
On top of this there is a secondary form of exploitation that allows 
capitalists to increase their wealth: lending money at interest. Th is process 
allows the money-lender to get richer year by year by doing absolutely nothing. 
Th is process has become increasingly important as a form of exploitation 
within the developed capitalist countries. Th e extension of credit in the last 
30 years means that the great bulk of the working class and lower middle 
classes and are in debt, exploited by the banks and credit card companies. Th e 
neo liberal policies of the last decades have widened the gap between rich and 
poor. A large part of societies income is now concentrated in very few hands. 
Th e rich tend to save a large part of their income. In consequence there would 
have been insuffi  cient consumer demand to keep the economy going without 
the extension of consumer credit. Th e system needs employees to consume, 
but to run at a profi t employees can only get a portion of the value created. 
Th e wealthy then lend workers back part of the value they created. But this 
process is self limiting, eventually the debt burden can grow no further.
In addition to supporting exploitation, the a monetary market economy 
is incompatible with the planned use of resources to meet social needs. In the 
EU — unlike, for example, the USSR — the supply of most goods and services 
is regulated by the market. Th is is not entirely a bad thing: it does, to a limited 
extent, allow supply to be adjusted to match people’s wants. Th e drawback is 
that the provision of goods and services is systematically biased towards the 
wishes and desires of the rich. Th e EU currently lacks the mechanisms by 
which the structure of the economy as a whole can be regulated in a conscious 
social way to meet the challenge of climate change and to equitably meet the 
needs of all citizens.
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3 How to eff ect the transformation
We will now shift  the focus to specifi c policy measures. We will present these 
one by one and while explaining how each measure helps to achieve the 
broader objectives we have described.
3.1 Monetary reform
European monetary policy is dominated by the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Th is institution, operating outside of any democratic control, is charged 
with ensuring the monetary conditions for the continued reproduction of 
European capitalism. Th e removal of the bank from democratic control, and 
the imposition of strict anti-infl ationary policies, represent one of the key 
victories of late 20th century liberalism. Of itself, infl ation is not necessarily 
against the interests of the poor and working classes, provided that wages 
keep up with prices. Th e people who are hit hardest by infl ation are the rentier 
class whose holdings of money and interest bearing assets depreciate. Since 
these people are opponents of socialism anyway, a socialist government might 
not worry about any fi nancial loss these people suff er, were it not for the other 
social eff ects of infl ation.
Uncertainty about future prices can lead to a social psychology of 
instability leading to a loss of confi dence in the social order. For this if for 
no other reason, it is desirable that a socialist government in Europe follow a 
policy of price stability. Indeed, our proposals to replace money with labour 
vouchers are tantamount to a long term policy of declining prices.
Given an objective to establish a socialist economy based on the 
equivalent payment of labour, monetary reform is a step towards this goal. 
We suggest that the ECB be placed under a legal obligation to maintain
a stable value of the currency in terms of labour. A prototype for this could be 
the successful monetary policy of the British Labour Government aft er 1996. 
At that time the government placed monetary policy under a committee of 
expert economists (the Monetary Policy Committee) rather than politicians, 
and gave them a clear legal obligation to achieve a particular target rate of 
infl ation. One might have expected this policy to be severely defl ationary, but 
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it was not. In part because, unlike the European Central Bank, the committee 
are legally obliged to avoid both defl ation and infl ation3.
Where our proposal diff ers from British policy is in the goal it sets 
— namely, fi xing the value of the Euro in terms of labour rather than in terms 
of the cost of living index — and in advocating a democratic composition of 
the Value Policy Committee which should control the ECB.
Th e aim would be to fi x the value of the Euro in terms of the average 
number of hours of embodied labour that an hour of labour will purchase. 
Th ere exist well established techniques using national input output tables 
by which the equivalence of money to labour time can be calculated. Our 
colleague Stahmer explains these. If in 2009 an hour was worth roughly 30 
Euros and the VPC wanted to stabilise this, they would have to adjust the 
issue of Euros up or down to ensure that the exchange of embodied labour 
against Euros remained constant.
Capitalist central banks try to control infl ation by adjusting the interest 
rate. If infl ation is too high, they raise interest rates. Th e eff ect is to choke off  
investment, reduce demand, and so reduce infl ationary pressures. If interest 
is banned, how is the price level to be regulated ? or, in the light of what we 
said earlier how would the Value Policy Committee ensure that the value of 
the Euro in terms of labour was held steady? 
An alternative control mechanism would be to adjust the overall volume 
of loans and/or the maximum term for which loans are made. Th e state bank 
could set volume targets and maximum durations for loans. For example, if 
the Value Policy Committee thought the value of the currency was in danger 
of falling it could limit the availability of loans or shorten the period for which 
loans could be had. If loan periods were reduced from 10 year to 5 years, then 
monthly repayments rise, just as happens with interest rate rises today.
Another means of regulating prices is tax policy. Paper money, like the 
Euro, is inherently worthless, just printed paper. It has value imputed to it, 
from the fact that the state (or a confederation of states) will accept its own 
currency for tax debts. Th e fact that people need money to pay their taxes, 
forces them to value it. If governments tax less than they spend, the money 
stock will rise leading to infl ation. Th e second way to regulate prices during 
the transition to socialism is thus to fi ne tune tax levels.
 
3 We would not fully endorse these objectives. In particular the failure of the MCP’s 
remit to include anything about the balance of trade, certainly contributed to a 
terrible build up of overseas debt.
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Th e reasons for the goal are : 
1. As labour productivity rises, a Euro fi xed in terms of hours of labour will 
be able to buy more each year, cheapening the cost of living. 
2. Once the value of the Euro has been stabilised in terms of labour value 
the labour value of Euro notes should be printed on them in hours and 
minutes. Th is step would be an act of revolutionary pedagogy. It would 
reveal clearly to employees just how the existing system cheats them. 
Suppose a worker puts in a working week of 45 hours and gets back Euros 
and sees that the hours printed on them amount to only 20 hours, then 
she will become aware that she is being cheated out of 25 hours each 
week. Th is will act to raise socialist consciousness, and create favourable 
public opinion for other socialist measures. 
3. As a fi nal stage the Euro would be renamed and redefi ned in terms of 
work time, and would cease to be a transferable physical currency. People 
would have electronic credits measured in, say, European Standard 
Hours, which would be redeemable against goods containing the same 
number of hours of work, but which could not be used for private 
speculative transactions.
Instead of just having a committee of economists charged with regulating the 
value of the Euro, the principle of participative democracy implies that the 
Value Policy Committee should be made up both of economists and members 
of the European public selected on a jury basis.
Th e Value Policy Committee would have to commission surveys of how 
much work was being done in diff erent industries, and how much monetary 
value added there was in these industries, in order to guide its stabilisation 
policy. Th e defi nition of monetary value added would be the same as that 
currently used to compute Value Added Tax.
3.2 Reform of accounting and pressure for fair prices
All fi rms currently have to prepare money accounts, Th e state should make it 
a condition of their accounts being approved, that they also produce labour-
time accounts and that they mark on all products their labour content.
Initially fi rms need not be legally obliged to sell their commodities at 
their true values. Th ey could attempt to sell them for a price that is higher 
or lower than the true value. But since consumers can now see when they 
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are being overcharged, they will tend to avoid companies that sell goods at 
above their true value. Th is will put psychological and consumer pressure 
on companies that are overcharging. Th is too will be an act of socialist mass 
pedagogy.
At an early stage in transition, before all goods have their labour values 
printed on their price tags, fi rms will have to impute labour values to the 
goods they purchase using the printed exchange rate between Euros and 
labour hours. Th ey will add to the labour value of their inputs the number of 
hours of work that are performed by their employees to get a labour value for 
the fi nal product.
At the level of National and Union accounts the EU should also move 
towards having a dual system of accounts, labour accounts alongside money 
accounts. Because, at the level of EU economic policy, there are many issues on 
which labour accounts would be more informative than money accounts. For 
instance in estimating the budget levels required to achieve full employment, 
this is much more readily done if one is comparing expenditure in labour with 
known labour reserves in the form of unemployment. In addition physical 
input output tables, and tables denominated in carbon dioxide outputs would 
be required. Money accounts hide the fact that what government economic 
policy really does is re-allocate society’s labour. Money is the veil behind 
which real labour allocation occurs.
3.3 Enshrine the rights of labour in law
Scientifi c evidence shows that in the capitalist world the money value of 
goods is overwhelmingly determined by their labour contents. Studies fi nd 
that for most economies the correlation between labour values and prices 
is 95% or above. So Adam Smith’s scientifi c hypothesis that labour was the 
source of value has now been statistically verifi ed. Th is scientifi c fact should 
be incorporated in law.
3.3.1 Th e right not to be exploited
European law should recognise that labour is the sole source of value and that 
in consequence workers, and their Unions, will have a claim in law against 
their employers if they are paid less than the full value of their labour. If we 
consider the previous measures and the educational eff ect that would follow 
from them, it should be relatively easy to pass a referendum on such a law.
Transition to 21st Century Socialism in the European Union  11
Following such a law being passed, there would be a huge wave of worker 
activism as workers sought to end the cheating and deceit to which they and 
their ancestors had been subjected. It would also bring about a very large 
increase in real wages, cementing support for the socialist government.
Th e employing class, on the other hand would see sharp fall in their 
unearned incomes. Employers who were active factory managers would 
of course still be legally entitled to be paid for the hours that they put in 
managing the fi rm, just like any other employee. 
Note that at this stage the establishment of the right to full value created 
would not mean the elimination of wage diff erentials. A legal right to the 
full value created would be a collective right of employees as a whole within 
a company. Such a system would certainly create strong moral pressures 
towards the equalisation of rates of pay, but the process by which this came 
about would be a matter for future collective bargaining and future civil rights 
legislation. Just as there is now legislation against gender discrimination in 
pay, a future European society is likely to legislate against other forms of pay 
inequality.
Th e tribunals to which such claims were brought would have to be 
dominated by juries rather than professional judges. Juries drawn from the 
population at large are likely to be less infl uenced by the special interests of 
the employing class than are judges whose social position is close to that of 
the employing class.
3.3.2 Th e right to industrial democracy
Th e emphasis above is on the state enabling the workers to act collectively 
to prevent exploitation. If unions won court actions giving employees the 
full value that they created, then there is a danger that some fi rms would 
attempt to close down and fi re workers rather than continue in business. Th us 
legislation aimed at protecting the rights of labour would have to include the 
right, aft er a suitable ballot of employees, for employees to elect the majority 
of the board of any company.
Th e cumulative eff ect of the measures outlined so far would be to 
substantially abolish capitalist exploitation in the workplace at least in the 
short term. Th ere will be long term diffi  culties if other measures are not 
taken, and we shall examine these later.
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3.4 Eliminating other forms of exploitation
In addition to the exploitation of employees by employers, there are other 
forms of unearned incomes, the most important of which are interest and 
rent. 
3.4.1 Usury
Interest, the getting of money from money itself, was regarded for thousands 
of years as sinful. Philosophers like Aristotle condemned it. Papal encyclicals 
banned it. Islamic law still forbids it in Muslim countries. But in capitalist 
countries, such was the social power of the banks and other money lenders 
that this moral objection came to be forgotten.
In capitalist countries which were undergoing very rapid industrialisation, 
for instance, Japan in the 1950s or 1960s, lending money at interest did 
serve a necessary economic purpose, since it allowed peoples savings to be 
channelled, via the banks, to fund industrialisation. But once a country has 
industrialised, fi rms fi nance most of their investment from internal profi ts. 
Indeed they normally have more profi t than they know how to invest. Instead 
of borrowing from the banks, industrial fi rms run a fi nancial surplus, and they 
themselves lend to the banks. Th e banks now channel the fi nancial surplus of 
fi rms into loans to consumers, or to governments. Lending at interest looses 
the temporary progressive function that it had during industrialisation and 
reverts to being what morality and religion originally condemned : usury.
Socialism abolishes interest as a form of income. It has no class of rentiers 
people who do no work but just live off  the interest on their money. So it is 
clear that at some point, that a government seriously intent upon socialism 
has to pass legislation banning the lending of money at interest. It could 
specify, for instance, that interest on debt could not be enforced in the civil 
courts. It could impose severe criminal penalties on those who used threats 
of harm to extort interest.
Before moving to a step such as this, a socialist government needs to put 
in place replacements for the economic functions still served by lending, and 
charging interest.
3.4.2 Rent
Rent is another type of exploitation. Socialists regard it as immoral since 
the owner of land enriches himself, not by his own labour, but by the labour 
of others combined with the niggardliness of nature. Rent is however an 
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inevitable phenomenon in a commodity producing society. If there is some 
product, be it crude oil, or corn, the effi  ciency of whose production depends 
on the land being used, then rent incomes will arise.
In a socialist economy all rent income should accrue to the state 
and be used for the good of the community. Socialist states have usually 
nationalised land, but have not always charged a rent for using the land. 
In the case of mineral extraction this made no diff erence, since this was 
done by state enterprises and rent would just have been a fi ctitious transfer 
between sections of the state. Failure to charge agricultural rents to farms 
will, however, accentuate diff erences in income between fertile and less fertile 
agricultural regions.
 It is a moot point whether land nationalisation would be popular today 
in Europe. An economic alternative, which over the long term would produce 
a similar eff ect, would be to introduce a land tax on the rentable value of land. 
Th is is an old populist objective, originally proposed by Henry George. Th e 
threshold for the tax could be set high enough to ensure that small farmers 
paid nothing or only a token amount, but for larger more fertile estates it 
could be set at a level that would confi scate the greater part of rent revenue. 
Th e eff ect on large landowners would be to deprivethem of their unearned 
income and making it available for communal uses If they refused it would 
be tax evasion but it is ideologically harder for the likes of the Duke of Atholl 
to mount a campaign to justify tax evasion than it is to mount one to justify 
resistance to expropriation.
3.5 Investment
It will still be necessary to fund new investments. During the crisis of 2008 
it has been necessary for some European states to take control of large parts 
of the banking system. From this basis it is clear that investment could in 
principle be funded by interest free loans from publicly controlled banks. In 
a time of recession however, it becomes important to ensure the availability 
of credit, so that even capitalist governments have to impose controls on the 
banking system. But if this is not done with care, the resulting expansion of 
the money stock will lead to the type of suppressed infl ation which occurred 
in the USSR.
Investment on credit is based on the illusion that you can push the cost of 
investment into the future. Whilst this can be true for an individual borrower, 
for society as a whole, today’s investment has to be made using today’s labour. 
As a society we can not get future generations to travel back in time in order 
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to do work for us. Socialist economies should thus rely predominantly on tax 
revenue to fund investment.
3.6 Debt and the credit crisis
Mature capitalist economies have an inbuilt potential for slump because the 
property owning classes tend to have more income than they can readily 
spend. In the early stages of industrial development this is channeled through 
the banks to fi nance real investment. As reserves of labour get used up, 
increasingly capital intensive investment is faced with a law of diminishing 
returns and becomes less profi table. If investment is insuffi  cient to balance 
saving, a slump is initiated.
Th e Keynesian solution to this was to tax the property owning classes 
and spend the proceeds on public projects to keep the economy buoyant. Th e 
neo-liberal approach since 1980 has been to cut tax on the propertied classes, 
whilst at the same time greatly easing the rules on consumer credit. Both 
solutions worked for a while.
Th e credit crisis of 2008 marked a turning point for the neo-liberal model. 
Credit had been extended so far that the ratio of debt to real income became 
unsustainable. Th e result was a general banking crisis. Instead of allowing 
banks to fail, the state bailed them out. Governments expressed relief that 
their action prevented a cascading collapse, but the cost was a growth in 
public debt unprecedented in peacetime. Was any other policy available? 
Th ere was an alternative policy. Th e failing banks could simply have been 
allowed to fail. Th e deposit guarantee schemes were generous. Only a small 
minority of bank customers held more than the guaranteed deposit. Th e 
majority would not have lost anything had the banks failed. Most customers 
have only modest amounts of cash, but a few very rich customers have tens 
of millions deposited. To them, the deposit guarantees were practically 
worthless.
Th e trillion-Euro public bailout was done to protect the claims of these 
few very rich depositors. Had all deposits above the the guarantee vanished, 
the class system would be threatened. For, Adam Smith said, what is money 
but the power to command the labour of others? Billions in a bank account 
play the role of a patent of nobility under feudalism. Modern Grand Dukes 
like like Lakshmi Mittal or the Albrechts’ have their titles on a bank’s hard 
drive rather than parchment, but they like their predecessors, still command 
the lives and labour of hundreds of thousands.
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Had the banks all closed down, credit card and cheque purchases would 
become impossible. But instead of allowing them to fail, a Jubilee could 
have been declared. It would have declared all debts incurred prior to Day 
Zero legally invalid, excepting modest guaranteed deposits. Th ose toiling to 
meet mortgage and credit card debt would have been liberated. Th e taxpayer 
would have been freed from the crushing burden of the national debt, and 
surprisingly, the banks would have become super-solvent. Th eir liabilities 
would have shrunk relative to their cash reserves. Industry would have 
remained privately owned. But the abolition of debt, which has been a radical 
measure since antiquity, would have hit the aristocracy of money the way the 
French revolution hit the aristocracy of land.
Th e Russians did it aft er 1917, and shortly later, the German Social 
Democrats achieved a similar eff ect via hyper-infl ation. Today, some 
governments have veered towards the German 1920’s course: printing money 
to pay for the huge debts they have taken on. Th e infl ation that results could 
hit small and large depositors alike. Th e alternative of abolishing debts serves 
to polarise political opinion against the peoples’ main enemy—the rentier 
interest—whilst benefi ting the majority.
3.7 State Finance
Th is brings us onto the general topic of state fi nance. Socialist economies 
typically have a higher level of state expenditure than capitalist ones at a 
comparable level of economic development. It is essential that the state has 
an effi  cient revenue raising mechanism, with taxes that are easy to collect 
and diffi  cult to avoid. Social democratic states like Sweden relied mainly 
on income taxes along with an effi  cient civil service. Th e USSR relied upon 
turnover taxes on industry and on profi ts earned by state fi rms. Which of 
these models of tax revenue should be used is one of the major strategic issues 
that has to be faced by as an economy moves towards a socialism.
We argue that the Soviet model of taxation had several drawbacks, 
which, in the long run, contributed to the fi nal collapse of the Soviet socialist 
economy.
a. Th e use of indirect taxation, such as turnover or value added taxes, and a 
fortiori reliance on profi t income, puts the state in the position of being a 
collective capitalist vis a vis the workers.
b. Th e use of indirect taxation has also traditionally been opposed by 
socialists as this is a regressive rather than progressive form of taxation.
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c. It resulted in a distorted price structure that systematically undervalued 
labour, to the detriment of economic effi  ciency.
d. Reliance on the profi t of state industry is a hidden form of revenue, which 
is not easily amenable to democratic control.
We therefore strongly advocate a reliance on income and asset taxes rather 
than indirect taxes. Th e tax basis of the Union should be switched from VAT 
to progressive income and asset taxes. Th e European Parliament should be 
able to adjust the tax rates paid to the Union, subject to gaining a majority in 
a Union-wide referendum. 
At the moment the parliament can not raise revenues on its own account, 
a fundamental requirement for a genuinely democratic assembly. But given 
the suspicion of the Union that exists, it would be unwise to allow parliament 
to introduce or change taxes without popular support.
1. Either the parliament or citizens initiatives should be able to propose 
new Union taxes such as income taxes, customs duties or property taxes 
provided that these pass a popular vote. 
2. Th e broad headings of the budget should be subject to popular vote. 
3. Th e EU central bank should be subject to the parliament. 
4 EU Democratisation
Th e split in authority and economic power between the EU and the nation 
states has at least partially blocked the road to the old social democratic / 
Keynesian means of dealing with recessions. Constraints on budgetary policy, 
lack of control over the currency and capital fl ows prevent nation states from 
following classic Keynesian policies. At the same time the EU itself lacks the 
budget or the power to substitute for the nation states in this situation. A 
consequence is the absence of a political form in which the labour movement 
of Europe can express itself in classical social democratic politics.
In the absence of classical social democratic politics you do not get 
the clear constitution of a European employee class, since a class cannot be 
constituted outside of a political party in the broad sense of the word.
Consequently we argue that it is necessary for the labour movements 
of Europe to take on board their own democratic version of European 
internationalism, since neither the technocrats of the EU itself nor the 
propertied classes of Europe are capable of doing this. 
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Th e proposed democratisation is a return to the original principles of 
European democracy in ancient Greece4 seeking to eliminate the Roman 
Republican elements which were instituted aft er the French revolution. 
At its heart must be the principle of popular sovereignty, and genuinely 
representative democracy.
1. Popular sovereignty being enshrined in the right of initiative and 
referendum on a whole Europe-wide basis on any issue for which a 
suffi  cient quorum of signatures, spread across enough countries can be 
obtained. Th is direct participation in binding votes as European citizens 
rather than citizens of the nations would constitute the Union as a real 
focus of politics. Th e right of initiative would encourage the formation 
of Union wide campaigns and movements. It could be exploited 
immediately by the trades union movement of Europe and would give 
them an impetus to unite in practice. 
2. We are taking this consciously Jacobin position in favour of strong 
democratic center, becaus only that has the power to confront 
internationally organised big business and big fi nance.
3. We argue that the parliament be a citizens’ body, not a body of highly 
paid elite politicians. At the very least we argue for the members to 
face elections annually and for the limitation of offi  ce to a maximum 
of 2 years to prevent the formation of a class of professional politicians 
divorced from the population. Half of the parliament should be chosen 
by lot rather than elected as present on a party list system. Th is again 
aims to increase citizen participation, across all classes and genders. 
4. Th e EU commission should be selected from and by the parliament 
rather than being party placemen. 
5. Th e parliament can legislate on any subject and if faced by a veto in the 
council of ministers can call a citizens vote to override the nation state 
representatives.
4 We of course know that women and slaves could not vote in Athens, but until 
the early 20th century women and workers could not vote in Europe under the 
parliamentary system. We are obviously not advocating a regression to slavery 
and patriarchy. What we are saying is that current EU states derived their 
constitutional model from the Roman Republic via the French Revolution, 
and as such conciously adopted a state form that was optimal to the rule of the 
propertied classes. It was for this reason that Ancient Greece faced the treaon of 
its propertied classes when invaded by Roman Imperialism. Th e Republic was 
seen then and now as the ideal form of rule by the wealthy.
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5 Th e ordering of measures
Th e measures above undermine what are important functional components 
of capitalism and there would be adverse consequences if alternative 
mechanisms were not put into place.
Ending the production of profi t by paying workers the full value they 
create would make employment unprofi table. Th ere is a danger under these 
circumstances that capitalists would fi nd it more profi table to leave their 
money in the bank and earn interest on it than use it to employ workers. It is 
important that the payment of interest be abolished prior to introducing the 
right to the full value of labour.
It would be necessary to introduce the right for employees to vote for their 
fi rm to be co-managed by a committee having a clear majority of employees 
on it, to stop asset stripping and closing of the now unprofi table fi rms.
Aft er this phase of transition the economy would still be capitalist, but 
the ownership role of individual capitalists would be greatly reduced. Th e 
most serious economic disruption would have been to the fi nancial sector 
where the profi tability of stockbroking and investment banking fi rms would 
drastically decline. But this decline would be manageable, being no worse 
than the structural changes to many heavy industries that occurred during 
the last 20 years.
A second phase of transition involves the development of the capacity 
for detailed planning - setting up of the administrative system, establishment 
of the democratic control mechanisms and construction of the computer 
networks and soft ware that would be required to carry out the sort of 
planning discussed in our book [1]. Initially these plans would be indicative, 
becoming mandatory as the system bedded down.
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6 Conclusion
We have outlined a model for the conversion of EU type economies that 
diff ers from the tradition deriving from German Social Democracy. Th e 
three stages of transition are shown below as a table.
Stage Money Property/rights Coordination Tax
1 Euro notes Capital right to Market Indirect and direct
(now) value added
2 Euro notes Tied Labour right to Market + Direct +
to labour value added, public banks Property tax
Debt cancelled no interest
3 Euro Labour Labour right to Consumergoods Direct taxes +
accounts value added market + cybernetic democratic
non circulating no interest coordination budget
Stage 1 outlines the current situation. Stage 2 the situation whilst the 
conversion measures we describe in the paper are being applied. Stage 3 is the 
situation described Towards a New Socialism.
Unlike the classic social democratic process, there is no distinct stage 
of nationalisation of fi rms with the attendant issue of whether there is to be 
compensation or not. Instead, there is a basic change to the framework of 
company law so that labour rather than capital acquires the right to value 
added. Th ere is then no need for the state either to confi scate or compensate 
shareholders. Th e situation would be analogous to the 13th amendment to 
the US constitution, which abolished slavery without compensating the slave 
owners. We are proposing that the Union similarly abolish wage slavery. 
Share holders could still own shares in fi rms, but they would have no right to 
obtain an income from them.
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 We are conscious of the fact that this New Historical Project of a postcapitalist 
civilization is a long and complex process that has to be resolved gradually, 
democratically and with the concurrence of all human beings who want to 
live in an ethical and democratic world society. But even the largest process 
begins with a tiny fi rst step. We want this program to be that tiny fi rst step 
and invite all of you to participate in its discussion and evolution in order to 
achieve a better life for all and the preservation of the planet.
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